The Energy-Water-Food Nexus and Its Implications for China-Africa Green Cooperation in Rio+20

2013/05/22

abstract

Global warming and the resulting climate change present the world with major and potentially devastating challenges. They lead to environmental degradation/scarcity and a radical reform of the energy mix among industrial countries, in addition to other resource scarcity concerns.[①] A generation has passed since the states’ governments began to seriously consider that the climate change has emerged as one of the top security challenges of the early 21st century, and presented the world with an array of shared economic, resource, environmental and energy challenges; “global climate change poses a real and present danger of environmental destruction and human dislocation on a scale that we’ve never seen.”[②]

Such nexus challenges of water, energy and food have generated a perceptible shift of security values in the world since 2011. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon argued, "In many parts of the world, water scarcity is increasing and rates of growth in agricultural production have been slowing. At the same time, climate change is exacerbating risk and unpredictability for farmers, especially for poor countries who are the most vulnerable and the least able to adapt, ensuring sustainable use of most critical finite resources is the key."[③]

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) always argues that Africa is most threatened by global warming. While not responsible for the threat of climate change,[④] African countries are extremely vulnerable to energy-water-food nexus challenges by climate change. Thomas Schelling argues that China and Africa will suffer from climate change more than developed countries.[⑤] The IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report estimates that carbon dioxide emissions from energy use could rise by 45 percent to 110 percent between 2000 and 2030.[⑥] The report indicates that two-thirds to three-quarters of the increased emissions would come from developing countries. The report also makes it clear that the greater the efforts to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, the less severe would be the impact of climate change. Considering China and South Africa are key stones for BAISC group, we should attach much more importance to China and African countries' cooperation and joint actions on nexus challenges by adapting and mitigating global warming for current and future generations.

I. Water-energy-food Nexus
Climate change presents the world with a broad range of stakeholders from the water, energy and food sectors in an effort to improve understanding of the interdependencies and develop a joint perspective on the common challenges. Global energy consumption is projected to grow by close to 49% from 2007 to 2035. Food production requires water and energy, the extraction of water requires energy, and energy production requires water. Food prices are highly sensitive to energy costs – which indirectly affect the GDP of a country as high costs of processing, irrigation, fertiliser and transportation affect production and lead to lower exports. It’s becoming ever more difficult to provide universal access to water, food and energy in the crisis time of climate change,” close to 1 billion people are undernourished, 0.9 billion lack access to safe water and 1.5 billion have no source of electricity.”[⑦]

Firstly, energy is fundamental to the prosperity and security of nations. However, any successful international effort to mitigate threats to human and national security posed by climate change must inevitably include controlling access to fossil fuel energy. Evidently, preventing catastrophic climate change is actually an energy challenge which has caught great attention of the entire human race. The human dependence on modern energy service or sustainable future in a modern society is ten to one hundred times greater than it was in an agrarian society. Climate change is caused mostly by traditional energy using - notably the burning of coal, oil and other fossilfuels - resulting in the greenhouse effect.[⑨]

Secondly, water is human basic need and required to produce food. Roughly 70 percent of global freshwater is used for agriculture, food and water scarcity will interconnect.[⑩] By 2030, demand for water is expected to grow by some 40%, and for food by 50%,[11] requiring a radical rethink of the world's approach to natural resources and consumption. According to the Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture a fifth of the world’s population live in areas of physical water scarcity.[12] The definition of water scarcity is a region where water resources development is “approaching or has exceeded sustainable limits” and “more than 75% of river flows are withdrawn for agriculture, industry, and domestic purposes”. 2.6 billion people do not have access to improved sanitation facilities and 884 million people do not use improved sources of drinking water.[13] The future water use scenario data by McKinsey & Company indicates that by 2030, we will face a 40% global supply gap of accessible, reliable water supply for economic development.[14]

Thirdly, water is required to produce energy and energy is necessary to manage water for different uses. The two assets are strongly linked and the provision of both is part of basic foundation to stimulate growth and improve livelihoods. World-wide, about 20% of all electricity is generated by hydropower.[15] As economies develop, however, the water demands for energy production rise rapidly. In the European Union (EU), for example, approximately 44% of water is used for energy production, and in the U.S. the annual rate is over 40%. Billions of people lack access to modern water and energy services.[16] This fact, coupled with population growth and growing economies at the national and regional levels, will mean that the demand for water and energy services will grow significantly over the coming decades.[17]

Thus, the energy-water-food nexus security caused by climate change presents a huge challenge to all human beings and needs global cooperation between developed and developing countries. Increased demand for water, food and energy will increase demands placed on resources particularly during climate change.

II. The Nexus Challenges for China and Africa
2.1 China and nexus challenges by climate change

In most cases, according to IPCC report,[18] China is among the worst countries affected by water-energy-food nexus challenges due to its vulnerable geographic position and economic structure. With rapidly growing population and urbanization, fresh water and food supply will be the most sensitive to climate change-induced impacts.

Global warming has directly brought greater weather extremes, droughts in the North and floods in the South of China.Water security in China will similarly be threatened. The Chinese government acknowledges that “climate change has already caused changes in the distribution of water resources all over China.”[19] Moreover, the government foresees that “climate warming will possibly reinforce the drought trend in northern China, and intensify water scarcity and contradiction between water supply and demand.”[20]

Food security in China is most likely to be threatened by water scarcity by climate change because China is particularly vulnerable to water shortages.[21] Chinese government acknowledged such adverse effects by stating that the “impact of future climate change on agriculture and livestock breeding will be mainly adverse. It is likely there will be a drop in the yield of the three major crops, white, paddy rice and corn.”[22] By 2030, “overall crop productivity in China could decrease by as much as 5-10 per cent if no action is taken.”[23] According to China's climate change country study, ”if recent climate change trends continue, much of Chinese agriculture is likely to face shorter growing periods and increased water deficits, requiring more irrigation”.[24] Under these conditions, by 2050 Chinese crop production (especially of wheat and corn) could decrease by 10%.[25] In short, possible impacts of climate change on Chinese agriculture could be highly disruptive.[26]

China energy dependency and scarcity will be worse with climate change, water and food scarcity.[27] China’s energy demand mix is dominated by fossil energy, of which coal constitutes 70.5% and oil 17.6%.[28] Most experts believe that for the foreseeable future—at least 30 years—this fundamental reliance on coal will remain, if not increase dramatically.[29] The dominant role of coal in China’s energy mix complicates Beijing’s ability to achieve certain abatement objectives. As the Chinese government articulated in its 2008 white paper, “China’s coal-dominated energy mix cannot be substantially changed in the near future, thus making the control of greenhouse gas emissions rather difficult.”[30] Recently, China overtook the United States to become the largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world. By 2020 China's average per capita energy consumption is expected to match the current global average, meaning that China alone will account for almost one-third of the world's total GHG emissions between 1990 and 2020.[31] According to OECD report, “ Carbon dioxide emissions in China could rise to over 11 bn tonnes in 2030, compared with 8 bn tonnes in the US, about 4.5 bn tonnes in Europe (OECD countries), and just over 2 bn tonnes in India. ”[32] China is already the largest global producer of coal, wind and solar power; has more nuclear reactors under construction than anywhere in the world, and hosts the planet’s largest hydropower station in the Three Gorges Dam.

Thus, the challenge to meet growing demand for water, food and energy is perhaps very serious with global warming. China is heavily investing in maximizing efficiency in water use for energy generation and food production, but it must ensure enough water is available for production to be expanded. Even worse than other countries, China accounts for about 35 percent of world steel production and about 50 percent of the world’s production of cement.[33] These industries and associated activities are also thirsty for water and deepen the food production decrease.

2.2 Africa and Nexus Challenges by Climate Change

According to the IPCC, the African continent is already warming faster than the global average and the impact of global warming on Africa is devastating.[35] The main challenges facing Africans will emanate from tropical storms, hurricanes and drought, more extreme water shortage and scarcity of foods, landslides, abnormal sea-level rises, and other extreme weather expected as a result of energy-food-water nexus by climate change.

Essentially, global warming leads to environmental degradation and resources scarcity. Energy-food-water nexus by climate change are by all means worse than anywhere in the world.[36] African countries emit very small amount of carbon emissions. However, many of them are energy insecure and depend on foreign aids and investments. The costs to Africa for adapting to nexus security by climate change would be sharply higher because of poverty and lack of investment. In Africa, the need is urgent. Nearly half a billion people- almost 70% of the population - have not enough access to electricity.[37] As IPCC argued, Sub-Saharan Africa is facing a water, energy and food crisis caused by climate change which could cost it $17 billion per year.[38]

Water challenges in Africa include: water scarcity, lack of clean water investment, energy poverty for water management, which have decreased food production in African. In the meantime, the higher worldwide food prices have and continue to fall into conflicts with the demand of an increasing population in African continent.

The FAO estimates that some 925 million of the world's people regularly go hungry, 265 million of them in Africa since 2011. East Africa's most severe drought in 60 years has left 10 million people desperately short of food.[39] "At the current rate of temperature increase, global average temperature will have increased by 1.5 degrees by 2050, making Africa lose 22 percent of it maize, 17 percent of its sorghum/millet, 18 percent of its groundnut and 8 percent of its cassava, 75 percent of the areas can expect yield declines of at least 20 percent" said Dione.[40]

Sub-Saharan Africa countries (719 million people) have severely limited access to energy, consuming between them, if South Africa is discounted, less electricity than New York State (19.5 million people).[41] With its low per capita fossil energy use, Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest emissions of the greenhouse gases that are the major cause of climate change. Lack of power has hampered Africa's efforts to meet the UN-agreed Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),[42] and contributes to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of children under five every year through respiratory ailments caused by smoke fumes from open cooking fires.[43] For example, in Nigeria “Less than 30 percent of Nigeria’s population in rural areas has access to safe drinking water because the nation’s water supply has lagged behind its water needs.” [44]

Moreover, urbanization in Africa is the lowest in the world, but its pace is the fastest worldwide. In Africa, more than half of urban population lives in slums and even in worse living conditions. Many areas in the city, equipped with no basic infrastructure, are vulnerable to energy-water-food challenges.

III China and Africa Green Cooperation against Nexus Challenges
Energy-Water-Food nexus, connected to climate change, present a huge challenge to all human beings. Cooperation between China and African countries, especially in the aspects of financial and technological cooperation, is needed to achieve a low-carbon development. Many developing countries at the industrialization stage face the risk of following the Western countries’ economic model from the late eighteenth century that was growth-oriented, unsustainable, and resource-intensive. 

Thus, green development will be the necessary alternative for dealing with Energy-Water-Food nexus challenges. China and the African countries need to promote green development while joining the global struggle against global warming and contributing to global economic growth. The cooperation between China and African countries is central to global efforts against Energy-Water-Food nexus with global warming. To make a breakthrough in Energy-Water-Food nexus challenges, the developed and developing countries must find a balance between the need for development, their energy consumption and carbon emissions.

3.1 The green development challenges to China and Africa

The changing world is offering developing countries, particularly China less and less security, because of three things: (a) the battle for new energy commanding heights, (b) the melting down of global financial system and (c) the mistrust and misperceptions of different political and ideological systems.

As to the green development, there are more barriers for China and African countries:

1. Politics. Developed World tends to see low-carbon technology as the core part of the national competitive power in the future, and therefore lack the political will to conduct transfer of such technology to the Developing World.

2. Market force. The instability of this market deters international technological investment from entry, while much of low-carbon technologies are mastered by enterprises from the Developed World. Such a situation encourages monopoly in low-carbon-tech market, resulting in market failure and rising difficulties of market entry to enterprises from the Developing World.

3. Finance: There are insufficient financial supports in technological transfer to the Developing World, especially in areas which new, uncommercialized low-carbon technologies harbor extra costs.

4. Policies. Most developing countries lack stable, well-defined and easy-to-use policies to give incentive for technological developers and technology-transfer receivers.

5. Incomprehensiveness. Much of the transfer deals focus more on technological innovation but less on upgrade and maintenance, while professional trainings required for maintenance operations never appear on the deals.
6. Transparency. Most enterprises from the developing world retain insufficient understanding to transferrable technologies, financing means, and technical demand from their respective industries, resulting in a lack of understanding of potential benefits from low-carbon technologies.

7. Institutional mechanism. For instance, inter-governmental organizations for communications and performance with governmental policies are in huge demand of placement. Such case has always led to issues relating to multinational dispute pending to be resolved by effective relevant institutions.

8. Facilities and resources. The developing countries lack proper facilities and operational resources. For instances, lack of transparency on trading information and standardized trading operations raises the cost of trading; overprotection in intellectual properties rights drives up prices high enough to be unaffordable for most developing countries; insufficient innovation mechanism restrict the ability for enterprises in these regions to adopt such technologies.

3.2 China and Africa should strengthen unity and uphold the principle of "the common but differentiated responsibility"[46]

Essentially, the implications of global governance on climate change focus on three counts: Firstly, developed countries continue to dominate international climate change negotiations. The fight against global warming can be described in terms of common goods. Even though there are many internal contradictions among rich countries, they share a common interest in trying to keep and widen the development gap and in staving off the rise of emerging powers. As a result, wealthy countries maintain their leading position in the post-Kyoto climate regime building process. Developed countries initially communicated with and consulted big greenhouse gas emitters in a bid to establish a rational and efficient post-Kyoto system that would safeguard and coordinate balanced development between energy consumption, the Earth's climate, and economic growth. At the same time, developed countries tried to persuade developing countries to accept soft and hard environmental constraints. Second, due to the early-development advantage of developed countries and the late-development advantage of developing countries, any major energy innovation would bring about a new industrial revolution and the reallocation of global industry. Developed countries have even launched a climate or carbon tax to put limitations on the economic growth of the developing world, particularly China. Developing countries are gradually assuming the obligations of stabilizing GHG. But because they lack new energy sources and advanced technology, developing countries only become emerging markets for Western multinational companies, while developed countries are making full use of climate change opportunities to strengthen their technical and competitive edge. As a result, they continue to dominate the international system. Obviously, the situation is the same for the environmental trade regime, which would let developing countries, bear the programmed baseline costs, while developed countries bear incremental costs. Developed countries are doing that to increase the environmental constraint for developing countries and eventually restrict the development of developing countries with a harsh law.

China and African countries still stay at a stage of rapid industrialization, urbanization and globalization. These countries not only need to improve their economy development, but also need to keep away from the risk of globalization. Those security problems centered on the nexus of water, food and energy, brought the developing countries with two aspects of challenges. Namely, on the one hand, the risk of connecting the human rights and nexus security is increasing and defending the sources and environment sovereignty is the common task of the developing countries. On the other hand, balancing the relationship of water, food and energy during the process of economic development and making smart choice. Consequently China and African countries needs to maintain the solidarity of the G-77 and China based on the coordination of the BASIC countries, forming a unified position of objecting the connection between the human rights and the water, food and energy issue.

China and African countries should continue to demand that developed countries provide non-commercial technology assistance to developing countries to help them cope with Energy-Water-Food nexus challenges and cultivate low-carbon emission economies. For China and African countries, global warming issues are also intimately linked to efforts to modernize the economy and the associated energy strategy necessary to bring about such modernization. Furthermore, Energy-Water-Food nexus challenges should be solved through international coordination, cooperation and mutual assistance in clean energy development. Developing countries are deeply dissatisfied with developed countries in this respect because the latter refuse to pay necessary regard to the constraints imposed by developing countries’ lack of development. Wealthy countries, for instance, place a low priority on technology transfers, and insist on the high price of intellectual property rights of these technologies.

3.3 China should help African Countries in green development

China and Africa is faced with unprecedented competitive pressure and opportunities for development. The lack of natural resources and developed infrastructure has crippled the development of Africa, particularly in green and low carbon development. Climate change is both a challenge and an opportunity. Africa, without any historical burden, can accommodate all advanced low-carbon technologies. As long as Africa can persuade companies to invest here and focus on these issues, there will be much scope for development. As for emission reduction and sustainable development, it is necessary to promote the integration of overall plans and policies on the international level. China already has rich experience in the coordination of economic development and water, food and energy security. China shall take full advantage of the Rio 20 Summit to advocate its experience and achieve the goal of China-Africa cooperation on the area of water, food and energy. Development and climate change, two interrelated issues, should be integrated in China-African cooperation. In addition, China and African countries should also promote the transition of energy technologies and energy restructuring, and financial support in the common progress. In the near future, the priority area for China-Africa green cooperation could be the following areas: popularize advanced technologies and products for energy conservation; adjust the mix of energy consumption; intensify the capacity building for adapting to climate; accelerate the R&D and application of low-carbon technologies, and market building for carbon emissions trade.

First of all, China’s Africa policies are those that acknowledge that environment economy and empowerment are strongly interconnected. Today the livelihoods of 1.6 billion people across the world depend on forests, deforestation, climate change, ecosystem destruction, food and water crisis and financial situations are problems that call for courageous regulatory intervention. Rwanda for instance is one of the three countries in Central and Western Africa to achieve a major reversal in the trend of declining forest cover. China should change the policy orientation to Africa of over-emphasis on economic and resource cooperation but relative neglecting climate change and issues of the environment. Climate security issues should be incorporated into the China’s African strategy and long-term development framework, to promote the building of comprehensive cooperation between China and African countries.

Secondly, China should vigorously help African countries develop energy-saving and energy efficiency technologies, renewable energy and new energy technology, clean coal development and utilization of efficient technology, oil and gas resources and coal-bed methane exploration and development and utilization of clean and highly efficient technology, advanced nuclear energy technology, carbon capture and storage technology, bio-sequestration technologies and carbon sequestration projects in other technology, agriculture and land-use greenhouse gas emissions control technology, because the technology is the most important long-term strategy to deal with the climate change in Africa continent. For example, in August 2007, UNDP, SU/SSC, CICITE officially signed the project document for South-South Global Assets and Technology Exchange Program, which was implemented by SUAEE. One year later, Nov. 2008, SS-GATE was established as an independent entity in Shanghai, China. So far, there are over 1500 projects on the SS-GATE e-platform, among which 80.7% are from the developing countries and 19.3% from the developed countries. 70 successful deals have been made with a trading volume of US$ 297.69 million so far.

Thirdly, Africa cannot effectively cope with today’s challenges without improving institutions and knowledge on climate change. That’s why it proposed to refine tools to work to improve the network of meteorological observation, among other solutions. China should help African countries strengthen the laws and regulations, policies, system and management mechanism to actively address climate change, and create a good institutional environment, policy environment and market environment for low-carbon development of enterprises. China top leaders always reiterate that China will continue to provide Africa with aid within its ability to meet the challenges of climate change, and China will provide more aid to Africa including in the sector of beating the challenges posed.

3.4 China-African cooperation for Post-Durban regime building

Three important achievements have been achieved in Durban: Kyoto extension, Durban Platform to discuss post 2020 global emission scheme, and green climate fund. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon argued it is an important advance in human battle against global warming. In Durban conference, more importantly, China demonstrates its global accountability and takes all-round diplomatic efforts to make a breakthrough at the Durban Climate Conference. Cancun Climate Conference 2010 resolved that any decisions on the future of the Kyoto Protocol will be deferred until conference in Durban. In Durban 2011, considering such a crisis and political dilemma as climate changes spread, discussed and negotiated all over the world, the solutions with all-round knowledge based efforts has been built partly by cooperation among and between China and African countries. China and the EU actually played as the leading role to deal with the deadlock and reach consensus on post 2012 climate change regime. China and African countries have determined that it is in their self interest to be part of the solution in Durban 2011. China together with Basic group and African countries have and will continue to offer comprehensive proposals to reduce their emissions, which included specific targets and timetables for Durban Platform on Enhanced Action.

China and African countries should be wary of a plot of different policy of "the Group of 77 and China" by developed countries. In addition, as emerging major developing countries have to face the pressure of the vast number of developing countries, especially the least developed countries and small island States. To alleviate the occurrence of the passive situation, China and African countries should strengthen communication and exchanges with these countries, which is an important strategic path for us. The "Kyoto Protocol" provides that the developing countries are without the responsibilities of emission reduction, which has laid a broad basis for developing countries and its cooperation. To this end, China and African countries should insist on the United Nations’ dominant position of addressing climate change. We should safeguard the "G 77 plus China” unity, and emphasize the complementary roles on the eight-nation summit and other multilateral consultations. China and African countries should also urge the implementation of the green funds for the vast number of developing countries to provide various forms of climate change adaptation and mitigation funding.

Climate change negotiations focus on emission reduction targets in real terms than that of how developed countries to promote the technical and financial support for developing countries. China and African countries should advocate the establishment of new cooperation mechanisms. "Hand in hand to cope with global challenges" should be the important principle of collaboration between China and African countries. China and African countries should actively plan for a "one voice" to jointly deal with challenges. China and African countries should play a leading role in building their own course of sustainable development in the above-mentioned problems, actively promote the technology and capital flows to African countries, and encourage all of African countries to embark on low-carbon economy and sustainable development.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the results are clear: the nexus security of water-food-energy will transcend general global governance and implies complicated conflicts of politics and ideology. Because of climate change, water plays a central role in the nexus of green development. The core issue of nexus security lies in the interaction of water, food and security. Due to the nexus of the three sectors, it is hardly possible to resolve the problem by single-sector governance or by one country alone. From the perspective of resource interdependence, nexus security provides a new explanation to global resource security, competition, cooperation and conflict, which help advances water-energy-food research from technological level to diplomatic strategy level and offers new instrument for global issues. Nexus security emphasizes that the particular nexus of water-food-energy has an influence on global strategy dynamics. The shortage of water is the major trigger of conflict. Because half of global population relies on food from Americas and Australia, the drought in Australia and the over-exploitation of water and biofuel in the US increase tension among water, energy and food. Climate change plays a central role in the nexus of green development. The core issue of nexus security lies in the interaction of water, food and security under global climate change. Due to the nexus of the three sectors, it is hardly possible to resolve the problem by single-sector governance or by one country alone; international cooperation against climate change should be put in the first priority, at most part, we should attach great importance to China-Africa green relations.

“The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones”. Whatever the outcomes and motivations, in order to deal with energy-water-food nexus, China and African countries should understand it is in their economic and national interest to stop waiting and move ahead for green and low carbon development. They are putting concrete proposals for mitigation on the table in the international negotiations, taking a constructive approach to energy-water-food with green development issues in bilateral and multilateral venues, and taking unilateral action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at home. Despite bearing relatively little responsibility for the current impacts of climate change, emerging economies have determined that it is in their self interest to be part of the solution. China and African countries can also work with other developing countries to offer comprehensive proposals to green their development, which included specific targets and timetables in Rio 20 this June. Together with other recently-announced plans, these proposals marked a sea change in the international debate, breaking the log-jam of the previous decade for the lag-behind of finance assistance and technology transfer from developed countries.
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[③] Anthony Smallwood, “The Global Dimension of the Fight Against Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, vol.167, 2008, pp.8-9.
[④] IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Scientific Basis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, http://www.ipcc.int.
[⑤] Thomas C. Schelling, 'What Makes Greenhouse Sense?' Foreign Affairs, 81, 3, 2002, p.2.
[⑥] IPCC, Climate Change 2007：Mitigation of Climate Change of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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[⑧] Stockholm Environment Institute, 2011Understanding the Nexus, Background paper for the Bonn2011 Nexus Conference,
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[41] CGIAR/All Africa Global Media via COMTEX, "Africa Most Threatened By Global Warming", May 24, All Africa, 2001.
[42] United Nations Statistics Division, Millennium Development Goals Indicators, July 14, 2009, http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/default.aspx.2009-8-2
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[46] Li Huailin ,” Nigeria supports Africa, G-77, China's position on climate change”, Xinhua News Agency, December12, 2009.

author： Yu Hongyuan